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Theparliamentary election of June 2016was expected to
be a decisive turning point in post-Franco Spanish pol-
itics. Pre-election polls saw the newly formed alliance
between Podemos and Izquierda Unida (IU) surpassing
Spain’s traditional Socialist party (PSOE) to become the
second largest political force behind the center-right
Partido Popular (PP). Given this constellation, Pablo
Iglesias, Podemos’s charismatic leader, appeared to be
in a favorable position to become Spain’s new prime
minister. The election resulted in a fiasco for Unidos
Podemos. Mobilizing one million fewer voters than in
the December 2015 legislative elections, Unidos Pode-
mos ended up a disappointing third behind the twoma-
jor parties — and this despite PSOE’s historically poor
score.1
The disastrous result renewed tensions over the fu-
ture course of Podemos, which had already flared up in
the run-up to the election, provoked by the alliance with
IU, a party of the traditional anti-capitalist left, domi-
nated by the Communist Party. Substantial currents
within Podemos, following Íñigo Errejón, the party’s
leading theorist, opposed the alliance, particularly after
IU’s leader, Alberto Garzón, had charged that Pode-
mos’s “populist strategy” championed by Errejón had
“exhausted itself ” (García de Blas and Manetto, 2016).
In Garzon’s view, Errejón’s populist vision had engen-
dered a process of “ideological moderation” designed
to appeal to as broad a constituency as possible. On
this reading, Unidos Podemos’s disappointing showing
in the election was a direct result of the programmatic
vagueness and dilution engendered by Errejón’s pop-
ulist strategy. Errejón and his partisans, in turn, blamed
the election result on the alliance with IU, which they
deemed in open contradiction with the original Pode-
mos project. Whereas the latter sought to transcend
the traditional left-right cleavage and construct a broad
social base for fundamental sociopolitical change, the
alliance with IU effectively relegated Podemos to “the
left-wing margins of the political spectrum”, thus jeop-
ardizing the very essence of the project (Calvajal, 2016).
In order to understand what is at stake, it is neces-
sary to revisit the origins of Podemos, review the major
ideas that informed its project, and examine its social
base of support.
Podemos originated as a political experiment
launched in 2014 by a small circle of intellectuals and
social scientists, mostly from Complutense University
in Madrid, inspired by the recent experience of Latin
American populism. Adopting key ideas from Antonio
Gramsci and Ernesto Laclau, they advanced a populist
project designed to take advantage of the window of op-
portunity that had opened up three years earlierwith the
Movimiento 15-M, a spontaneous grassrootsmovement
of predominantly young people protesting against the
Zapatero (PSOE) government’s austerity policies (Beas,
2011). The strategy was to appeal to the broad segments
of the Spanish population that were suffering from the
economic crisis and exhausted by the EU-imposed pol-
itics of austerity, and mobilize them by articulating dis-
parate popular grievances and claims directed against a
common enemy labelled la casta.
Errejón and Iglesias insisted right from the start that
the central political goal behind Podemos was one thing
— to take over power from Spain’s self-serving and cor-
rupt elites in order to bring about a “post-neoliberal
transformation through the state” and make the institu-
tions work for the benefit of ordinary people (Iglesias,
2015, 15). The provocative cover of a collection of es-
says on the popular TV series “Game of Thrones” that
analyzed the narrative of the series from a social sci-
ence perspective drove the point graphically home: It
featured a drawing of a relaxed Pablo Iglesias comfort-
ably seated on the Iron Throne (Iglesias, 2014b). In
the preface to the volume, Iglesias explained some of
the lessons to be learned from the series for real-life
politics in current-day Spain. Arguably the most inter-
esting observations were on the relationship between
power and legitimacy. According to Iglesias, Game of
1Pre-election polls had Unidos Podemos at about 25 percent of the vote; they won a bit more than 21 percent.
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Thrones taught that in politics there was no space for
legitimacy “in the abstract, for a legitimacy that was
not prepared to convert itself into alternative political
power, to compete for power.” Competing for power,
in turn, necessitated having a “political project” that is
“credible, plausible, and real” (Iglesias, 2014b, 7). What
made Podemos competive, Iglesias insisted, was that it
had an “idea,” or what Errejón would call a “hypothesis.”
This hypothesis was that politics is fundamentally
about “the construction ofmeaning” through discourse;
that language and discourse represent the “fundamen-
tal battle ground” for contesting the dominant narrative
and constructing new collective political identities and
new majorities; and that this contestation has to be in-
formed, not by theoretical dogmas, but by the concrete
claims and demands of ordinary people (Errejón, 2016).
As a frequent guest on television and host of his own talk
show (La Tuerka) broadcast on regional television and
over the internet, Iglesias understood the central im-
portance of communication for political mobilization.
His communicative skills andmedia presencemade him
the natural choice for party leader. Articulate and en-
dowedwith an undeniable charisma, he became the face
of Podemos.
Errejón and Iglesias believed that the prolonged so-
cioeconomic difficulties in Spain following the 2008
financial collapse had provoked a profound crisis in the
post-Franco (1978-) political regime that was reflected
in “the failure of the ruling institutions — including
the mainstream political parties — to preserve and re-
new their legitimacy” (Iglesias, 2015, 10). As a result of
this legitimacy crisis, they assumed, traditional politi-
cal identities had started to break up and disintegrate,
opening up opportunities for a left-wing populist dis-
course no longer grounded in the established left-right
dichotomy but resting on a new dichotomy — above/la
casta vs. below/la gente—that they believed had the po-
tential of becoming majoritarian (Errejón, 2014). They
derived their optimistic reading of the Spanish situation
from their experience with, and analysis of, left-wing
populism in Latin America (particularly Venezuela),
which, as Iglesias emphasized, “should serve as our fun-
damental point of reference” (Iglesias, 2014a, 37).
Given its founders’ connections with the Chávez
regime, Podemos was repeatedly charged with harbor-
ing antidemocratic, perhaps even totalitarian, tenden-
cies (Ruiz Soroa, 2015; Delibes, 2016). Against that, its
leaders maintained that Podemos was all about reclaim-
ing democracy from the privileged minority, which had
appropriated it in the post-Franco era, and restoring it
to the people. In short, Podemos was fighting for fun-
damental political change in order to bring about true
democracy in Spain.
Initially, Podemos proved highly successful. In the
2014 European elections, the party received almost
eight percent of the vote, which translated into five seats
in the European Parliament. This was followed by the
municipal elections later that year, where Podemos’s
support of independent local citizen platforms was cru-
cial for the election of progressivemayors inMadrid and
Barcelona. Finally, in the national election of Decem-
ber 2015, Podemos became Spain’s third-largest party,
pollingmore than twenty percent of the vote. With none
of the major parties in a position to form the new gov-
ernment, Podemos assumed a pivotal role in the new
political constellation. After the failure of a series of
negotiations between the major parties aimed at form-
ing a coalition government, a new election was called
for June 2016, resulting in the bitter disappointment for
Unidos Podemos.
There are a number of possible explanations for the
fiasco. One has to do with Podemos’s social base. The
“Podemos hypothesis” depended for its success on the
mobilization of a broad spectrum of the electorate. In
reality, as a number of studies have shown, Podemos’s
appeal was largely limited to a younger, better educated,
predominantly urban constituency who, in ideological
terms, overwhelmingly placed themselves on the (far)
left (Criada Olmos and Pinta Sierra, 2015; Fernández-
Albertos, 2009). Podemos supporters distinguished
themselves by their high level of disenchantment with
the political system and, in particular, the political class
—a disenchantment informed particularly by their high
sensitivity to (political) corruption (León, 2014). In
addition, Podemos attracted a significantly larger pro-
portion of men than women in every age group. A
number of explanations for this gender gap have been
offered, among them women’s greater risk aversion; the
lower labor participation rate of women; and a leader-
ship largely dominated by men (Orriols, 2015; Claveria,
2016; Criada Olmos and Pinta Sierra, 2015, 239-240).
Secondly, the success of the “Podemos hypothesis”
depended to a significant extent on the disintegration of
the established partisan alignments in the wake of the fi-
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nancial crisis and prolonged austerity. The resulting col-
lapse of the post-1978 two-party system was supposed
to make enough voters available for populist mobiliza-
tion to secure Podemos amajority. This did not happen.
If anything, the outcome of the June election shored up
the established system to the detriment of the new actors
(Unidos Podemos and especially Ciudadanos). This was
hardly surprising given the progressive deterioration of
Podemos’s image among the electorate: Between late
2014 and late 2015, the number of survey respondents
who said they would never vote for the party increased
from 42 to 52 percent (Lavezzolo et al., 2015).
Given its founders’ connections with
the Chávez regime, Podemos was
repeatedly charged with harboring
antidemocratic, perhaps even
totalitarian, tendencies. Against that,
its leaders maintained that Podemos
was all about reclaiming democracy
from the privileged minority…and
restoring it to the people. In short,
Podemos was fighting for
fundamental political change in
order to bring about true democracy
in Spain.
A third reason was the alliance with IU. Not only
did the alliance strain Iglesias’s credibility as a politi-
cal leader, it also further reinforced the perception that
Podemos was a party of the radical left. Less than a year
before the June election, in a major interview, Pablo
Iglesias had rejected the very idea of an alliance with the
extreme left. These were old leftists who, he charged,
were “sad, boring and bitter,” who took ordinary peo-
ple for idiots addicted to trash television, who were
ashamed of their own country and their own people,
and who, in the final analysis, were partly responsible if
nothing ever changed in the country (Picazo, Delàs and
Iglesias, 2015).
Given these invectives, the alliance with IU was
nothing short of a strategic U-turn, which a significant
number of both parties’ supporters found hard, if not
impossible, to swallow. Not surprisingly, some of them
stayed home (Jurado and Orriols, 2016). At the same
time, the alliance threatened to relegate Podemos to the
leftwing margins of the political spectrum, thus jeopar-
dizing its populist project. In response, the party lead-
ership reinforced its efforts to make Podemos appealing
to broader constituencies. Among other things, they
issued the party’s election program in the style of the
Ikea catalogue, which presented the party’s candidates
engaged in domestic activities (Iglesias, for instance,
watering a plant). In order to appeal to female voters,
they designed a campaign poster that featured portray-
als of Unidos Podemos’s leading politicians equally di-
vided by gender (four women, four men). Finally, to
appeal to mainstream, particularly older, voters, who in
the past had been least disposed to vote for Podemos,
the party’s leaders further moderated their discourse.
Pablo Iglesias, towards the end of the election campaign,
promoted himself as a social democratic politician and
patriot. None of these tactical maneuvers proved par-
ticularly successful.
The fiasco of the June 2016 election appears to have
marked the end of Podemos’s populist strategy, at least
for the immediate future. This, at least, would only
be logical. The title of the collected volume on the
Game of Thrones mentioned earlier was, after all, “Ga-
nar o Morir” — “Win or Die”. In the short introduc-
tion to the collection, Iglesias compares Podemos to the
Khaleesi Daenerys Targaryen. After the June election,
the Khaleesi will have to wait another day to assume the
IronThrone.
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Multiple Traditions in PopulismResearch:
Toward a Theoretical Synthesis
by Bart Bonikowski & Noam Gidron
Harvard University
The Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S. presidential
election have attracted newfound public attention to
populist politics. Despite its recent salience, however,
the phenomenon has a long history on both sides of
the Atlantic. In Europe, populist parties on both the
right and the left have been gaining strength since the
1990s (March, 2007; Mudde, 2007), and populist ap-
peals have been a staple of Democratic and Republican
candidates in theUnited States formuch of the 20th cen-
tury (Bonikowski andGidron, 2016; Kazin, 1998). Latin
American politics, of course, is well known for its pop-
ulist leaders (Hawkins, 2009; Roberts, 1995, 2006). In-
deed, scholars have been studying populism for decades,
typically relying on case studies of individual countries
or regions. This rich tradition has generated a wealth of
research findings, but less consensus on how populism
should be conceptualized and empirically analyzed.
The diversity of approaches to the study of populism
is in part a result of the growing importance of compar-
ative research on the topic. Theoretical orientations that
prove insightful in one region are often found wanting
when applied to structurally disparate cases, leading
to the proliferation of definitional approaches and em-
pirical strategies. The lack of a single shared research
framework is also a consequence of the amorphous na-
ture of populism itself. The ideal of “the sovereignty of
the people” (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, 323) takes on
myriad forms and shares much in common with com-
monplace democratic principles, which complicates a
precise bounding of the concept.
Nonetheless, amidst this multiplicity of theoreti-
cal perspectives, there is some consensus concerning
a minimal definition of populism, one that lends itself
to comparison even if it does not capture all aspects of
the phenomenon. We can think of populism as a form
of politics predicated on a moral distinction between
corrupt elites and the virtuous people, with the latter
viewed as the sole legitimate source of political power
(Laclau, 1997; Mudde, 2007). Just who the elites are
varies across context, as do the boundaries of “the peo-
ple”, but the binary structure of populist claims is largely
invariant. In addition to itsmoral logic, populism’s anti-
elite orientation often lends itself to a wholesale rejec-
tion of intermediary institutions.
This core definition is relatively uncontroversial,
but scholars differ in how they interpret, operational-
ize, and elaborate on it. This conceptual variation can
be reduced to three dominant approaches, which view
populism as (i) a strategy of political mobilization, (ii)
an ideology, and (iii) a form of political discourse. Al-
though these distinctions are primarily theoretical, they
have implications for how populism is measured in em-
pirical research. In addition, there is a separate de-
bate concerning the relationship between populism and
democracy, with some scholars seeing the two as stand-
ing in tension to one another, and others arguing that
they are deeply interrelated. We are ambivalent about
the normative implications of populism, but we do take
a position on its conceptualization: we make a case for
the analytical advantages of the most minimal, discur-
sive definition of populism that treats the phenomenon
as an attribute of political claims rather than actors. We
end with a series of unresolved research questions that
a discursive approach to populism can help address. It
is our hope that this brief — and necessarily partial —
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